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Abstract 
Online innovation contests have been used by more and more firms for idea seeking and 
problem solving. Most studies of contests take the perspective of innovation seekers, and 
little is known about solvers’ strategies and responses. However, contest performance 
also relies on understanding solver responses. This paper provides insights to these 
questions. Specifically, we show that past experience of a solver is a good predictor of 
his future winning probability and that winners are more likely to be those who submit 
early or later during the submission period as opposed to those submit in the middle. 
We also find that “strategic waiting” (to submit solutions) is associated with higher 
winning probability. Furthermore, we show that different contests appear to attract 
solvers with different expertise, which invalids the common assumption of fixed solver 
expertise distribution across projects in previous literature. This finding has strategic 
implications to the design of contest parameters. 
Keywords:  Open Innovation, Winner determination, Strategic bidding, Online 
contest, Online bidding, Crowdsourcing, Past Experience 
 
Introduction 
Open innovation contest (Terwiesch and Xu 2008; Yang et al. 2009), or crowdsourcing contest (Archak 
and Sundararajan 2009; Howe 2006; Yang et al. 2008),  in which an innovation seeker, which can be a 
firm, an organization or an individual, runs a contest to seek innovative ideas or solutions to a problem, 
has been adopted by more and more firms for problem solving and new product development. By 
launching online innovation contests, firms can easily reach large volume of external solvers with 
diversified background. A larger pool of potential solvers can help facilitate faster and potentially better 
ideas or solutions compared to internal innovation efforts. For instance, in September 2008, Google 
funded a $10M launch of an open innovation contest. The project was called Project 10^100 and calling 
for ideas to change the world, in the hope of making world better. Since 2006, Netflix set 1M prize every 
year seeking to substantially improve the accuracy of predictions about how much someone is going to 
enjoy a movie based on their movie preferences. In addition to self-facilitated open innovation contests, 
several markets also exist to facilitate open innovation contests. InnoCentive, founded in 2001, is the first 
online market to host open innovation projects in form of contests (Allio 2004). It was originally built to 
facilitate seeking for innovative medicine solutions. But for now, as an emerging result, a variety of 
projects are posted there, ranging from website LOGO design, algorithm design to complex project such 
as construction design. There also exist other contest markets with different focus or geographic region, 
such as Topcoder, and TaskCN, and various organizations or companies are using these markets as 
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platforms for open innovation projects. For firms lacking IT deployment capacity or channels of reaching 
huge potential solvers, launching their innovation contests in a mature online market is an obviously 
better choice. In the future, we expect that more and more firms will adopt open innovation to mitigate 
the risks of internal projects and identify exceptional solutions from across the globe. 
To launch an online contest, an innovation seeker needs to post project details including a set of fixed 
prize, duration, description and etc. All potential solvers decide whether to join the contest or not and if 
they join, they compete by submitting their solutions/products. After the contest ends, the seeker will 
assign the prize to the solver who provides the best idea/solution according to some criteria. Several 
theoretical studies have been done on contests. Dahan and Mendelson (2001) pursuit an extreme value 
model and argue that the final performance of a product development contest is decided by the top tier 
distribution of solvers. Terwiesch and Xu (2008) have extended this model to more general contest 
situation where projects may have multiple dimensions such as expertise and ideation based. If the 
distribution of solver ability is irrelevant to the project characteristics, having more solvers will give a 
seeker higher chance to get better solutions. A typical assumption made in previous theory literature is 
that all solvers receive the same information and compete simultaneously.  
However, in most online contest markets (i.e. Zhubajie, TaskCN, 99designs, CrowdDesign and etc.)1, we 
observe that solvers are competing dynamically instead of simultaneously. As shown in the typical 
timeline of an online contest (Figure 1), a solver can enter the contest at any time from the time the 
contest starts to when it ends. Since an online contest market usually makes the status of a contest 
(including the number of submissions, and even their final submissions, etc.) available, therefore, 
depending on the time the solver enters, they receive different information and can take different 
strategies accordingly. For example, by waiting longer, a potential solver has more information regarding 
number of competing solvers and the quality of submissions available. As a result, he2  has better 
evaluation of his chance of winning and can take more effective action accordingly. On the other hand, by 
submitting a good solution early, the solver may discourage other solvers from submitting solutions 
further. Besides, submissions are usually accessible to public and this policy makes each solver consider 
when to submit his solutions to maximize his winning probability. Thus, the winning result is also 
impacted by solvers’ bidding behaviors.  
 
 
Figure 1. Dynamic Timeline of Online Contest 
 
The goal of having an online contest is to attract high quality solvers and obtain good and diversified 
solutions (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Terwiesch and Xu 2008), which relies not only on contest design 
parameters but also on the understanding of solvers’ incentives and strategic actions. A good contest 
                                                             
 
1 We consider the contest scenario of most popular online contest markets. Although InnoCentive receives 
lots of academic attention, it is not a popular online market. Thus its business model and policies are not 
considered in our study.   
2 In economic research, for the convenience of discussion, buyer is usually “she” and seller is “he”. 
Similarly in this paper, we call a seeker “she”, and a solver “he”. 
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design should take into account solver behavior, and it is important to understand the strategic 
interactions between solvers. However, to our knowledge, not only there is scant empirical literature on 
contests, but there is a lack of understanding of how solvers compete with one another strategically. This 
research has two goals: First, we aim to unveil the factors that can influence a solver’s chance of winning. 
Second, perhaps as a result of lack of understanding of how solvers compete, a common assumption made 
in previous theory literature is that solvers are drawn from the same distribution regardless of contest 
design parameters. That is, solver distribution is the same across contests (Terwiesch and Xu 2008). In 
reality though, there are often more than one contest, especially on a contest market, that a potential 
solver can participate in, and due to capacity constraints, solvers may self-select themselves into different 
contests. That is, it is likely that some contests are more able to attract more experienced solvers than 
others. If this is true, then previous assumption underlying many theory works is invalid. We are 
interested in testing whether this is empirically true or not. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In next section we discuss the features of online 
contest markets that may affect solvers’ performances, and hypotheses are developed. Then we describe 
our data source, variable measurement, and the empirical models to test our hypotheses. At last we 
present our empirical results, followed by conclusions and implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
This study takes the perspective of contest solvers. Consider an innovation seeker posting a project on an 
online contest market and a number of solvers enter. To a solver, how to maximize his probability of 
winning is perhaps the question he is most concerned about. The quality vi of solution from solver i, 
where i =1… n can be modeled in a linear format (Terwiesch and Xu 2008):  
                                                               iiiiiii erev ξβξβ ++= )(),,(                                       (1) 
where βi is the expertise level of solver i. It is usually assumed that the distribution of expertise is known 
and it is fixed across all contests. r(ei) is the output of effort when solver i executes effort ei. r(ei) is 
increasing with ei. ξi is a random error term of each solution. This random error also captures the 
unobserved preferences of the seekers and includes the diversified ideation-based output. Since βi is fixed, 
the variance of a solver’s performance is mainly based on the effort output r(ei) and random error. As 
noted earlier, due to dynamic competition process, solvers’ bidding strategies may also impact the 
winning results, thus equation 1 can be modified to: 
                                                                    iiiiiiiii
sersev ξβξβ +++= )(),,,(
                               (2) 
Next we will explore the impacts of a solver’s expertise and bidding strategies on winning results. Effort 
output r(ei) is usually difficult to observe directly but its impact will be discussed with related bidding 
strategies.    
Expertise/Past Experience Impact 
Previous studies indicate that individual performance is restricted by his expertise (Banker and Iny 2008; 
Snir and Hitt 2003; Terwiesch and Xu 2008). How to define expertise with online contest scenario in a 
quantifiable way is a key task for empirical study. In organizational literature, there are two views of 
expertise. The first view is based on the knowledge possession of individual (Rorty 1979). In this approach, 
knowledge is a material that can be abstracted, explicitly represented, codified, and accessed (Walsh 1995). 
In online contest, free entry attracts solvers with diversified background. Following this view, Terwiesch 
and Xu (2008) suggest that expertise is usually a measure of a solver’s past experience and knowledge for 
a particular problem. For example, the winner of a LOGO design contest is more likely to be a designer 
than a chemist. However, diversified expertise is hard to reach a unified define for crowd of solvers, 
because one area of knowledge is not comparable to another. Another perspective perceives expertise is 
context dependent, emerging from patterned interactions and practices in specific scenarios (Brown and 
Duguid 1991; Faraj and Sproull 2000; Snir and Hitt 2003). Following this view, expertise of a solver can 
be reflected by his emergent and relative contest performance results by comparing with other solvers in 
the same community such as participation experience and past experience.  
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In reverse auction literature, past experiences have been proved to be good predictors for future winner 
determination (Banker and Iny 2008). In reverse auction, agents are bidding with project proposals 
which are signals of final solutions. An experienced agent gaining high value of winning propensity and 
feedback represents that this agent is consistently good at negotiating and maximizing principal’s utility 
by sending “right signals”. In online contests, solvers are bidding with final solutions. In other words, 
solvers are bidding with their skill of doing, not negotiating. A seeker with better performance discloses 
his consistent better expertise. On one hand, we could conclude that this solver has higher expertise level, 
and on the other hand, we can predict that this solver will have higher probability of winning. Terwiesch 
and Ulrich (2009) have done an experiment with MBA students and provide proof to show that the 
quality of submissions of a specific solver is consistent over time. Therefore, we expect that expertise level 
is positively associated with winning probability in the future. We have the following hypothesis: 
H1: A solver with higher expertise level is more likely to be the winner.  
Temporal Strategy 
Internet enabled initiatives allow geographically distributed players to collaborate or compete together. 
Comparing to traditional or offline contest, one distinguished feature is that online contests allow players 
to compete dynamically, instead of simultaneously. When to enter and bid is a common concern of all 
solvers. A long stream of studies has been done to understand auction bidder’s dynamic bidding strategy 
and benefits. Late bidding in Internet auctions has attracted a good deal of attention (Ockenfels and Roth 
2001; Ockenfels and Roth 2006; Roth and Ockenfels 2002; Vadovic 2009). The intuition behind last-
minute bidding in a private value auction is that there is an incentive not to bid high when there is still 
time for other bidders to react, to avoid an early coming bidding war that will raise the expected final 
transaction price (Ockenfels and Roth 2001). On the opposite side, an early and high bid can lower 
bidder’s searching cost for substitutions and make other competitors less interested in this competition 
(Vadovic 2009). Unfortunately little attention has been paid to strategic bidding of online contest. In an 
online contest, with project search tool, a solver may strategically choose when to enter and when to 
submit his solution, as long as the contest is not ended. From a solver’s perspective, his most interest is to 
know the best strategy that maximizes his probability of winning. To know that, we need understand all 
the benefits and drawbacks of early and late actions, in order to find out the dominant strategy or any 
equilibrium in this dynamic game.  
Benefits mean any positive impacts on the goal of winning, and drawbacks are for the opposite impacts. 
Generally speaking, by entering early, the solvers can have option of when to submit and which, at least, is 
better than no options. So entering earlier is always not a bad choice. Although entering early requires the 
solver be more patient in waiting for the result, this strategy has no negative impact on winning result. By 
submitting the solution early, the solver has the advantage of getting feedback from the seeker earlier and 
still having time to implement the feedback accordingly. Successfully implementing the feedback seeker 
desires will undoubtedly increase the solver’s probability of winning. In addition, by submitting a good 
solution earlier, the solver may also discourage other solvers from competing further because a good 
solution may make other solvers perceive lower winning probability and therefore drop out. On the other 
hand, by purposely waiting, the solver has more information about the number of competing solvers and 
the quality of submissions. More information gives the solver better evaluation of winning probability, 
and the solver can then take actions accordingly. For example, they will pursue the project further if he 
perceives high probability of winning and drop out if winning probability is low. This suggests that a 
solver will incur costs only when he perceives high probability of winning, reducing the expected costs 
However, the fact that a solver submits late may be a direct result of entering the contest late. Therefore, 
the time lapse between entering time and submission time may reveal something strategic. Specifically, a 
solver who purposely waits will have relatively higher time lapse compared to solvers who submit late 
because of entering the contest late.  
Let’s take a simplified participation process as example. Assume that a solver can only choose to enter or 
submit at two moments, called early, and late. After entered, he needs further decide when to submit. If 
he enters early, he can choose to submit early or late. If he enters late, he can only submit late. In total 
there are three strategies of participations. We summarize the benefits of each strategy in table 1.  
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Table 1. Temporal Strategy Analysis of Solvers 
 More likely to receive 
feedback and make 
improvement  
 Stop others to enter by 
submitting a high quality 
solution  
 More time to work on 
solution 
 More chances to learn from 
competing solutions. 
 
 Less likely to be copied by 
others 
 More time to work on solution 
 More chances to learn from 
competing solutions. 
 
 
Enter Early I 
 More likely to have similar 
competing solutions  
II 
 Less likely to receive feedback 
 Less likely to be copied by 
others 
Enter Late 
 
III 
 Less likely to receive feedback 
 Lost benefits of entering early 
 Submit Early Submit Late 
                         Notes: - benefit          - drawback     
 
By comparing strategy II to strategy III, it is obvious that strategy II has more benefits than strategy III as 
it gives the solver more time to work on solutions and more chances to learn from competing solutions. In 
other words, strategy II dominates strategy III.  
Comparing strategy I to strategy II, after removing all the benefits in common, we can see that each of 
them still have some unique benefits. Strategy I solver is more likely to receive feedback and make 
improvement desired by the seeker; he may also prevent others from entering by submitting a high 
quality solution. Strategy II solver is more likely to submit a unique solution and make the solution more 
competitive. In perception of solvers, it’s not clear which strategy is dominant. Since there are no 
dominant strategies in the dichotomous contest, it is not surprising that there exist more than a unique 
equilibrium.  
Above analysis is based on a simplified situation where only two entry/submit moments are available. In a 
real contest, solvers can submit at any moment when the contest is open. At any moment, each solver has 
the benefit of submitting earlier than some solvers and the benefit of submitting later than the other 
competing solvers. We assume the benefit of submitting early early submitP at moment t is convex and 
monotonically decreasing (i. e., )exp(| 321 tCCCP tearly submit −+= , where C1, C2, and C3 are constants and C2, 
C3 >0). When a contest is just launched, early submitP is the highest. When a contest is ending, early submitP is 
the lowest. Similarly, we also assume the benefit of submitting late late submitP at moment t is convex and 
monotonically increasing (i. e., )exp(| 654 tCCCP tlate submit += , where C4, C5, and C6 are constants and C5, 
C6>0). When a contest is just launched, late submitP is the lowest. When a contest is ending, late submitP is the 
highest. The overall benefit of submitting at moment t is late submitearly submitt PPP +=| , which is convex and 
non-monotonic. In other words, either submitting very early or late may increase the chance of winning 
than those submissions in between. Thus we have: 
H2a:  the probability of winning follows a U shape in terms of solvers’ relative submission order.  
Track: Economics and Value of IS 
 
6 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
 
In a dichotomous contest, entering early is always better than late, and this result is still hold in a real 
contest. In a real contest, after a submission is observed, we also concern about the interaction between 
entering time and submitting time. To capture entering strategy and the interaction with submitting 
strategy, the time lapse between the entering and submission time is more interesting. This time lapse 
reveals not only how early a solver entered, but also the strategic waiting before final submission. On 
another hand, it may also be a noisy measure of effort output r(ei) in equation 2. Regardless of strategic 
waiting or higher efforts, we expect that a solver’s chance of winning is increasing in this time lapse. We 
have: 
H2b: The longer time lapse between entering time and submission time is associated with higher chance 
of winning. 
Strategic Choice of Projects 
As noted earlier, another question of our interest is to test whether solvers with different expertise level 
choose different projects systematically. For example, do solvers with higher expertise tend to choose 
higher-prize projects? Many previous studies assume that expertise has no impact on choice in order to 
simplify the theoretical model. However Terweisch and Xu (2008) doubt the validity of this common 
assumption. In online reverse auction market. Snir and Hitt (2003) find that high value projects attract 
pools of solvers with lower quality in average. Does contest market have similar phenomenon? An 
experienced solver should have learned how to increase his profit by choosing “right” projects. If so, this 
would suggest some self-selection bias and invalid the common assumption of previous studies that 
expertise distribution are constant across different projects. To test the validity of above common 
assumption, we have the following null hypothesis: 
H3: A solver’s expertise does not affect his choice of projects. 
 
Data and Estimation Model 
In this part, we introduce our research site, sample selection, sample data, measurement of constructs, 
and estimation model. 
Research Site and Sample Selection 
We collect data from TaskCN.com, which is one of the largest online service markets in China and 
founded in 2005. By the end of 2009, TaskCN has over 2.7 million registered solvers. This market allows 
anyone to launch a contest with prize deposit in advance. All contests are free to enter. This contest model 
has also been adopted by most online contest markets such as Zhubajie, TopCoder, DesignCrowd and etc. 
We collected all contests launched between June 2006 and October 2008. In total, there are 7,728 contest 
projects. Around 20% of the projects are multi-winner projects. We eliminated these projects since the 
optimal design of prize structure has not been fully understood and is not the core of this study. Sales 
force contests were also eliminated since sales force contests are pursing maximizing the overall 
performance of all solutions, not just one or several best solution (Liu et al. 2007; Terwiesch and Xu 
2008). After censored, our sample includes 1995 contests with 216,812 submissions.  
Sample Data and Measurement 
Expertise Variables 
Following perspective that expertise is context dependent, emerging from patterned interactions and 
practices in specific scenarios (Brown and Duguid 1991; Faraj and Sproull 2000), in online contest market, 
expertise of a solver can be reflected by his emergent and relative contest performance results by 
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comparing with other solvers in the same community such as participation experience and past 
experience. In practice it’s hard to define expertise objectively. In our study, a solver’s participation 
experience and past experience can be measured by3: his number of participations N_Join, number of 
winnings N_Win, membership age MembershipAge, and winning propensity WinPerJoin prior to 
entering a new contest. Since WinPerJoin = N_Win / N_Join, we only include two of three at the same 
time. WinPerJoin is an ability measure which is unique and critical. Although participation experience is 
important, the winning experiences can tell a solver how to win, so we keep N_Win. Some solvers have 
very long membership age, but these extremely high levels of experiences are not likely to have 
proportionately additional credit for probability of winning. Hence, we take membership age natural-log 
transformed to reflect the diminishing marginal benefit of increased experience. In summary, in our 
estimation model, we use N_Win, Ln(MembershipAge), and WinPerJoin to proxy for expertise measures.  
Table 2A. Expertise Variables Definition 
Variable Definition 
N_Win Total number of winnings before current contest. 
N_Join Total number of participations before current contest 
WinPerJoin N_Win / N_Join, winning propensity 
MembershipAge Number of days between registration and entering current contest 
 
Table 2B. Descriptive Statistics of Expertise Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
N_Join 19.992 66.933 1 1368 
N_Win 1.032 5.916 0 163 
MembershipAge (Days) 85.4778 142.31 0.0001 813.16 
WinPerJoin 0.018 0.070 0 1 
No. of Observations 216,812 
 
Temporal Strategy Variables 
The strategies that a solver can fully control are limited. We list all temporal variables in Table 3A. As 
discussed before, the most concern of a solver is when to join (JoinTime) the contest and submit to his 
solution (SubmitTime). In order to compare across contests with different duration settings, we 
standardize these time values with following equation: 
                                      
Duration
StartTimeSubmitTimeSubmitTimeG −=_                                        (3) 
G_SubmitTime is a value between 0 and 1. If G_SubmitTime=1, it means the solver submitted just before 
the project is closed. With the same method, we get G_JoinTime and G_ΔTime. G_JoinTime measures 
the standardized time that a solver enters a contest. G_ΔTime measures the standardized time lapse 
                                                             
 
3 In auction studies, feedback rating is a key indicator of expertise (Snir and Hitt 2003; Banker and Iny 
2008). However in contest, feedback rating doesn’t help since nearly all winners are receiving positive 
feedbacks. That’s because winners are chosen based on final performances, and there is no information 
problem. A winner is always relatively better than other competitors. Our data shows that 98% feedbacks 
are positive, and nearly no variances. 
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difference between JoinTime and SubmitTime. G_ΔTime captures not only when to submit, but also the 
interaction with submission time. So this value is more informative than G_JoinTime.  
However the standardized time value may not reveal a solver’s temporal strategy. In practice, if there is 
only one solver in pool, no matter when he submits, he is always the first and the last to submit. In this 
circumstance, JoinTime and SubmitTime are useless in winner determination. To reflection the variation 
of competing strategy of relatively “early” or “late” submissions, the submission order of a solver 
(SubmitOrder) is more important. We define G_SubmitOrder as: 
                                                                        
SubmitN
rSubmitOrde
rSubmitOrdeG
_
_ =                                   (4) 
G_SubmitOrder is also a ratio between 0 and 1. If G_SubmitOrder=1, it means this solver was the last one 
to submit. With the same method, we have G_JoinOrder, which measures the relative time that a solver 
enters a contest.  
Table 3A. Strategy Variables Definition 
Variable Definition 
JoinTime The time that a solver declares that he will join the competition 
G_JoinTime (JoinTime-StartTime)/Project Duration 
JoinOrder The number of joined solvers when this solver joins. 
G_JoinOrder JoinOrder/N_Submit 
SubmitTime The time that a solver submits his initial solution. 
G_submitTime (SubmitTime-StartTime)/Project Duration 
SubmitOrder The number of submitted solutions when this solver submits. 
G_SubmitOrder SubmitOrder/N_submit 
∆Time  Submit Time – Join Time 
G_∆Time ∆Time/Duration 
 
To test H2a and H2b, G_SubmitOrder and G_∆Time are needed. Descriptive statistics of these two are 
listed in Table 3B. 
Table 3B. Descriptive Statistics of Strategy Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
G_SubmitOrder 0.500 0.284 0 1 
G_∆Time 0.051 0.131 0 0.9995 
Number of Observations 216,812 
 
Correlation coefficients among all necessary variables that estimation model will use are listed in Table 3C. 
Table 3C. Correlation Coefficients of Participation Variables 
 N_Win WinPerJoin Ln(MembershipAge) G_∆Time G_SubmitOrder 
N_Win   1.000     
WinPerJoin   0.237   1.000    
Ln(MembershipAge)   0.216   0.165   1.000   
G_∆Time   0.051   0.056   0.095 1.000  
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G_SubmitOrder - 0.035 - 0.022 - 0.016 0.282   1.000 
 
Project Group Variables 
Participations are grouped by contest projects. There are several project group variables which are fixed to 
each submission within a project. These variables may impact a solver’s perceived probability of winning 
such as prize, duration, category, dimensions and etc. Descriptive statistics of these fixed project variables 
and categorical means are in Table 4 and 5. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Fixed Project Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Max Min 
Number of Solver 111.67 319.94 4498 1 
Prize Amount (￥) 287.15 361.952 5500 1 
Contest Duration (days) 21.28 15.81 104.11 0.0021 
Number of Projects 1995 
 
Table 5. Category Means and Features of Projects 
Category Prize(￥) Duration No. Solvers Percentage Dimensions 
Web Building 285.01 20.81 13.53 3.3% Ideation & Expertise 
Translation 67.58 13.37 118.78 1.40% Expertise 
Software Develop 126.84 17.32 8.31 5.45% Expertise 
Q&A 61.70 16.67 22.48 5.15% Q&A 
Media 316.89 16.05 15.49 3.25% Ideation & Expertise 
Web Design 483.57 21.66 18.19 6.65% Ideation & Expertise 
Product Design 545.55 25.32 18.87 5.15% Ideation & Expertise 
Packaging Design 439.73 30.43 31.23 1.9% Ideation & Expertise 
LOGO Design 358.66 22.59 60.56 40.5% Ideation & Expertise 
Interior Design 245.17 17.24 21.46 0.85% Ideation & Expertise 
Graphic Design 288.35 19.56 38.3 13.5% Ideation & Expertise 
Creative Writing 159.21 19.74 71.34 7.5% Ideation 
Naming 136.28 25.32 729.22 9.6% Ideation 
 
Estimation Model 
To estimate what kind of solvers tend to win and to test H1 and H2, we employ the conditional logit model 
(Wooldridge 2001, Greene 2002) which is commonly employed in consumer choice research, especially 
when the number of alternative choices is large. For an innovation seeker of contest project i, her utility 
function of choosing solver j’s submission is: 
                                                      iijjij N, jXU ,...21   * =+= ξβ                                    (5) 
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Where ijξ accounts for all unobservable attributes that can affect seeker’s preferences. The value provided 
by solver j is determined by jX , which include solver j’s expertise and temporal strategy with a common 
parameter vector β . Although we cannot observe and measure the utility of each submission, we can 
conclude that the winning submission offers the highest utility to the seeker. That is, if the seeker finally 
chooses submission of solver iw  ( },...2,1{ ii Nw ∈ ), then we can assume that this utility iij wjU =|  is the 
maximum among Ni utilities. When Ni disturbances, ijξ is independently distributed with the Type I 
extreme value distribution (McFadden 1974). Then the probability that iw is the only winning submission 
of project i is: 
                                                    },...21{  ,
exp
exp)(
1
iiN
j
j
j
ii N, w
X
X
wWprob
i
∈==
∑
=
β
β                               (6) 
To estimate the coefficient vector β , we use maximum likelihood criterion. Variable Winik is 1 if solver k is 
the winner, otherwise, Winik =0 for all non-winners. We estimate the β by maximizing the log-likelihood 
function: 
                                                   ∑∑∏
= ==
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wWobWinwWL                     (7) 
Results and Analysis 
Table 6 reports the results of who is likely to be winner of a contest based on conditional logit model. 
Pearson correlation coefficients between each term are all lower than 0.3 (Table 3). 
Table 6. Conditional Logit Model and Results 
ξβββ
βββ
++++
++=
 Time∆GrSubmitOrdeGrSubmitOrdeG             
WinPerJoinAgeMembershipWinsNU
fed
cbaij
)_()_()_(
)()()_(
1
2
11
111
*
 
Variable Symbol Coefficient Significance Odds Ratio 
N_Win β1a    1.0442*** <0.001 2.8413 
MembershipAge β1b  - 0.9642   0.219 0.9080 
WinPerJoin β1c    0.1794   0.222 1.1965 
G_SubmitOrder β1d  - 2.0205*** <0.001 0.1325 
G_SubmitOrder2 β1e    2.7364*** <0.001 15.4313 
G_∆Time β1f    1.9991*** <0.001   7.3824 
Number of observations 21,6812 observations grouped in 1995 cases 
Pseudo R2 8.84% 
LR Chi2 1671.91*** (Prob>Chi2 is less than 0.0001) 
 Note: *~p<0.1, *~p<0.05, ***~p<0.01. Expertise variables have been transformed to percentile scores 
Since we are using conditional logit model, the influence of each factor needs to be explained with 
significance and odds ratio. Above result shows that in our selected expertise variables, the winning 
experience is a good predictor of future winning result. Odds ratio of N_Win is larger than 1, so a solver 
with more winning experiences is more likely to win in the future. H1 is supported.  
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Regarding the temporal strategy, coefficients of G_SubmitOrder and G_SubmitOrder2 suggest a U shape 
curve (Figure 2) of winning probability. In other words, very early submissions and very late submissions 
have higher probability of winning than those in-between. Therefore, H2a is supported.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Estimated Utility – U shape 
 
Besides, larger G_∆Time is highly associated with higher probability of winning. So H2b is also 
supported. 
We should note that one should be cautious in interpreting the results on temporal strategy. Specifically, 
it doesn’t mean submitting earlier or later can definitely increase probability of winning. The intrinsic 
incentive of doing that should be receiving feedback earlier, discouraging other solvers from further 
pursuing the projects, or learning more competing submissions to make own submission more 
competitive. If a solver just intends to submit first or the last without concerning seeker’s feedback or 
learning from competing submissions, his probability of winning won’t increase at all. Our finding does 
suggest that more capable solvers may have self-selected themselves into submitting earlier or later. For 
example, those who submit late must be good ones and have perceived high winning probability because 
they have observed all available submissions and they would not pursue further unless he believes that he 
can beat others. On the other hand, a capable solver also has a lot to gain by submitting early because he 
can discourage other solvers from participating further while taking advantage of likely feedback to 
further improve his solution. This has some interesting implication to seekers. For example, when 
evaluating submissions is costly, a seeker may want to focus more on earlier and later submissions than 
in-between ones.  
Given that the project characteristics are fixed within each contest, it is meaningless to add these variables 
in conditional logit regression. In order to know how these impacts vary for different projects, we get 
sectional results of project categories, dimensions, prize values, and duration sections. Winning ratio and 
membership age has been removed due to insignificance. Income is also removed from regression since 
it’s out of interest here.   
Table 7. Sectional Results by Category 
LOGO Design Graphic Design Naming Software  
Variables 
(647 Cases) (235 Cases) (163 Cases) (82 Cases) 
N_Win   0.0332***   0.0168*   0.0075 - 0.0182 
G_SubmitOrder   0.7780 - 1.3345 - 5.6585***   1.7127 
G_SubmitOrder2   0.1653   2.2804**   5.5533*** - 0.9925 
G_∆Time   2.5350***   2.2611***   1.8647***   4.2145*** 
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Pseudo R2   13.33%   9.73%   3.32%   16.26% 
Note: *~p<0.1, *~p<0.05, ***~p<0.001.  
 
Table 8. Sectional Results by Dimension 
Ideation Expertise Ideation & 
Expertise 
Q&A 
Variables 
(342 Cases) (137 Cases) (1413 Cases) (93 Cases) 
N_Win   0.0030 - 0.0186   0.0207*** - 0.0046 
G_SubmitOrder - 4.4475*** - 1.0155   0.0137 - 3.9954** 
G_SubmitOrder2   4.6086***   0.9489   1.0332**   2.5395* 
G_∆Time   1.8872***   4.0297***   2.5415***   2.9361** 
Pseudo R2   3.38%   11.87%   11.62%   8.07% 
Note: *~p<0.1, *~p<0.05, ***~p<0.01.  
Result in Table 7 shows that submitting strategies show no significant impacts on winning results of 
LOGO design, software development projects and all expertise based projects, but very significant impacts 
to naming or pure ideation based projects. For ideation based projects, the probability based on 
submitting order is a symmetric U shape. In other words, the first submission and last submission have 
equal chance of winning and higher than other submissions. However in Table 8, G_SubmitOrder is not 
significant and G_SubmitOrder2 shows positive and significant impact. So for ideation and expertise 
based projects, winners are more likely from those who submit late.  Longer G_∆Time is always helpful to 
all kinds of projects. Expertise variables also work differently for different categories. For software 
projects or all expertise based projects, previous performance doesn’t appear to help. This is surprising 
since the winning result is assumed to be consistent with expertise level. Both expertise and strategic 
variables behavior quite different influence from category to category, so project category as a project 
characteristic can moderate expertise and strategic impact on probability of winning.  
To understand how variances of contest prize and duration moderate those impacts, we split all projects 
into several sections: prize higher or lower than average, duration longer or shorter than average (Table 
9). Results show that when prize is higher, expertise variables play more important role in predicting 
winners, and winners are also more likely to be those who submit late. When duration is shorter, expertise 
plays less important role. But again, those who submit later are more likely to be winners.  In other words, 
for high prize and short duration projects, learning from other submissions are more beneficial.  
Table 9. Sectional Results by Prize or Duration 
All High Prize Low Prize Long 
Duration 
Short 
Duration Variables 
(1995 Cases) Prize>287 Prize<287 Duration>21 Duration<21 
N_Win    0.0108***   0.0268***   0.0034   0.0153***   0.0079** 
G_SubmitOrder  - 1.3456** - 0.4769 - 1.7922*** - 2.1892*** - 0.7137 
G_SubmitOrder2    1.9449***   1.5790**   2.1074***   2.7392***   1.3767** 
G_∆Time    2.6157***   2.3481***   2.7777***   2.7633***   2.5140*** 
Pseudo R2   8.58%   11.77%   7.08%   8.29%   8.98% 
 Note: *~p<0.1, *~p<0.05, ***~p<0.01.  
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To test H3, whether different contest designs can capture different groups of solvers, we calculate the 
correlations between contest designs (prize and duration) and all available expertise signals. In general, 
we calculate the correlations between average expertise of projects and contest designs. Besides, we also 
check the correlations according to different tiers of solvers.  Since project dimensions may impact solver 
distribution, we put correlation results in three sections: ideation based projects, expertise based project, 
and ideation & expertise based projects according to dimensions defined in Table 5.  
There are two additional signals we use in table 10: PrizeWon, and PrizeWon/PrizeJoined. PrizeWon is 
how much prize a solver has won in history, which is an experience measure and also is the “official” 
expertise indicator used by TaskCN. PrizeWon/PrizeJoined is another winning propensity measure in 
format of prize. PrizeJoined are the cumulative prize of all projects that a solver has participated. In total 
we have four experience based signals: N_Join, N_win, PrizeWon, and Membership Age. Besides, we 
have two winning propensity signals: WinPerJoin and (PrizeWon/PrizeJoined). 
To interpret the correlation in table 10, for example, for ideation based projects, the correlation between 
solvers’ average N_Join and duration is negative ( ρ = - 0.167) and significant (p<0.01). That means for 
longer duration contest, the average N_Join of captured solvers is significantly lower. Similar result also 
holds for middle-tier solvers because the correlation is also negative and significant. However for top-tier 
solvers, or bottom-tier solvers, duration variation doesn’t show significant association with N_Join.  
In general, result shows that for ideation based projects (e.g. naming projects), the distributions of 
experience based signals and winning propensity signals are associated with prize or duration variations. 
And usually higher prize or longer duration results solvers with less experiences and lower winning 
propensity. Similar influence also holds for middle-tier solvers and top tier solvers. Although this is not 
expected by innovation seekers, since ideation based innovation is a highly random process and doesn’t 
require specific expertise (Terwiesch and Xu 2008), it won’t lower the individual performance 
significantly.  
For expertise based projects (e.g. software development), it’s surprising that prize has nearly no 
significant correlation with any expertise variation on average or any tier. For duration variation, only 
middle-tier and top-tier solvers’ winning propensities are negatively and significantly associated. So for 
expertise based projects, assumption of constant expertise distribution is still hold if duration is fixed. 
For ideation & expertise based projects (e.g. graphic design), the situation is similar to what we get for 
ideation based projects, where both experience based and winning propensity expertise are negatively and 
significantly correlated with the variation of prize or duration. In addition, winning propensity of bottom-
tier solvers is also influenced. However, different from other two sections, correlations between 
prize/duration and expertise of top-tiers are positive and significant. That means, for higher prize or 
longer duration contests in this section, although captured solvers are with lower level of expertise on 
average, the top-tier solvers are with higher level of expertise. If the performance is mainly decided by the 
top-tier distribution (e.g. extreme value model), it’s still beneficial for seekers to increase prize or duration.  
Overall, our finding rejects H3 and suggests that the assumption of fixed expertise distribution is not 
always valid for online contest market.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study provides empirical evidence that in an online contest market, both a solver’s expertise and 
strategy are associated with his probability of winning. The number of winnings in past experience is a 
good predictor for future winning probability. Specifically, a solver with more winning experiences in the 
past will have higher probability of winning in future. In an open environment, earlier submitting solvers 
have the benefit of receiving feedback earlier from seekers while later submitters have the benefit of 
learning more information from competing submissions. Our results confirm that solvers with early 
submissions and late submissions are more likely to be winners than in-between submissions. We also 
show that those solvers who purposely “wait” in submission have higher probability of winning.  
We also find that project characteristics can moderate expertise and strategy impact on probability of 
winning. For naming projects, higher prize and shorter duration will make the U shape probability curve 
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flatter. And when prize is lower or duration is longer, strategic waiting doesn’t help much in increasing 
probability of winning.  
Finally, we find that solvers distribution is not constant across different projects. Solvers with more 
participation and winning experiences are not necessarily more likely to choose higher-prize projects. In 
fact, for ideation related projects, they show a trend of choosing relatively lower prize projects. Increasing 
prize is a common strategy that seekers are using, in order to attract better solutions. In general, our 
result shows they may actually reach lower quality solvers on average by doing that. However, for the 
most popular projects, which require both ideation and expertise, higher prize and longer duration can 
still help to capture better top-tier solvers. If the overall performance is decided by top-tier solver 
distribution, increasing prize or extending duration is still beneficial.  
In general, why longer duration results lower quality solvers is unknown. Whether extending duration is 
beneficial is ambiguous. It seems an optimal duration exists. How to explain this phenomenon remains 
for future study.  
In this study, while we have identified the importance of relative submission orders for solvers, it is still 
not clear how submission order is related to general submission time. From innovation seekers point of 
view, knowing when they will receive most and the best solutions is what they are more concerned about. 
It will be an interesting future study to explore factors that will expedite arrivals of good solutions. 
Moreover, our results have provided evidence that different projects, even within same category, attract 
solvers with different expertise level. Therefore, how to design a project that can attract better quality 
solvers, as of strategic concern to seekers, will be an interesting future research question too. 
At last, the validity of our findings is depending on specific contest scenario. Once the fixed-prize policy or 
the visibility of submissions is changed, our results need to be revisited. It could be more interesting to 
use game theory and the bidding strategy and mechanism of the auction theory to explain the problems 
presented in this study. 
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